37 pages • 1 hour read
George BerkeleyA Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1710A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Summary
Background
Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Key Figures
Themes
Index of Terms
Important Quotes
Essay Topics
Tools
BetaThemes
The Dangers of Abstraction
Throughout the Treatise, Berkeley inveighs against the “doctrine of abstraction,” which he characterizes as a “fine and subtle net […] which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men” (21). By the “doctrine of abstraction,” Berkeley means the proposition, current in the philosophy of his day, that the human mind can form ideas of abstract concepts. The doctrine of abstraction maintains that we cannot only see a particular man but can also conceive of “man” as a general concept. Not only can we see the color red, but we can also conceive of “color” as a general concept without reference to a specific color, such as red, blue, or white.
This premise is false, Berkeley argues, because in thinking about the idea “color” we are always thinking about a particular color; we cannot actually think of an abstract or nonspecific “color.” An overreliance on abstraction in our thinking gradually brings us away from the simple truth of things as they are, introducing doubt and skepticism about our ability to discover truth. Thus, for Berkeley, abstraction eventually leads to an absurd questioning of everything, whereas the true goal of philosophy is to arrive at settled convictions. Such skepticism is “indolent” or lazy, because it fails to “go through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever embraced” (89).
Related to his critique of abstract thought, Berkeley faults “speculative mathematics” for positing fantastical theorems, such as the theory that lines are infinitely divisible (89). Such branches of study are remote from “the concerns of life” and tantamount to “amusements” (90). Not only are the theories highly unlikely to be true, but they have little or no application. In fact, “speculations about infinites” (89) only appear true on graph paper; they do not hold in the real world, where Berkeley has argued that there “are no such thing as parts infinitely small” (90). At best, such theories are useful tools for helping us understand mathematical concepts but have no place in serious philosophy.
The Dangers of the Misuse of Language
Berkeley announces toward the beginning of the book that he intends to show how “the nature and abuse of language” (7) play a role in leading us astray in philosophy. Overly abstract language misleads us to believe that abstract concepts reflect the nature of the real world. Berkeley identifies the “source” of the doctrine of abstraction in language (17). The root error of language is the proposition that “every name has, or ought to have, one only precise and settled signification” (17). On the contrary, a word can be defined in a number of ways and signify “a great number of particular ideas” (17); a formulated definition, no matter how precise, cannot encompass all of the shades of meaning that a word might have.
Another misleading notion is that “language has no other end but the communicating ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea” (18). In reality, language has a much wider application that conveying rational knowledge. Its other purposes include exciting passion or emotion and persuasion toward taking a course of action. Through the connotations of particular words or phrases, we can influence people to think a certain way, quite independently of rational argument. Berkeley uses the example of a philosopher saying, “Aristotle has said it” (19) to induce the hearer to accept an opinion merely on Aristotle’s authority. Berkeley says that it is common for philosophers to use words like “absolute, external, exist” (66) in vague ways, without knowing what they really mean.
Berkeley insists that to arrive at “a firm system of sound and real knowledge” (66), we must use language as precisely as possible. We must also ensure that the philosophical claims we make have an actual meaning in reality. To do so, we must look inside ourselves and consider our own “naked, undisguised ideas” (22), testing what is being said against what we already know to be true. Only then will language become an instrument for finding the truth rather than of a source of confusion, obscurity, and overcomplication.
God’s Existence As Revealed in Nature
Berkeley holds the optimistic (non-skeptical) view that knowledge is attainable for human beings and that certain truths are “near and obvious to the mind” (25). He argues that the existence of God is one of such truths. It is wrong to believe that we cannot “see God,” because evidence of God’s existence is all around us. The presence of God is obvious if only we open our eyes and minds. Berkeley argues that unbelief in the existence of God is due to “stupidity” and “inattention” to what reason reveals to us (99).
God’s existence can be inferred from “the effects of nature” (98) such as the rain, wind, and seasons. Berkeley argues that we recognize God’s existence in much the same way that we recognize the existence of other human beings. When we see other human beings, we see a “certain collection of ideas” (99) that indicates the existence of beings like ourselves. Just as we can see the effects of human motions and actions in society and civilization, so we perceive the effects of God all around us in nature.
We primarily recognize God’s existence and presence through our ability to perceive things. It is God, the ultimate spirit, who is the source of all things and reveals them to us through our senses and mind. God’s presence is a “pure and clear light which enlightens everyone” but nevertheless “is itself invisible” (98). Yet, to “an unbiased and attentive mind” the existence of this “All-wise Spirit” (101) is evident. Such an attentive philosopher will also realize that God is provident and caring and that we have “a most absolute and immediate dependence on him” (104).
Berkeley combines his conviction about God’s existence with his doctrine about spirit and idea to draw a conclusion that refutes one of the main trends in the philosophy of his time. Philosophers in the 17th century increasingly devoted themselves to studying the nature of secondary, or natural, causes. By investigating the physical forces at work in the natural world, they contributed to the development of the empirical method in modern science.
Berkeley, however, is committed to an immaterial view of reality and insists that only spirits can be causes. Hence, Berkeley argues that contrary to the scientific view of the time, God directly causes everything not caused by man. Berkeley argues that forces in nature should be viewed as “signs” of God’s activity rather than “causes” in their own right. It is a more worthy task for philosophy to seek the meaning of those signs than to try to explain everything that happens by reference to “corporeal causes” (55).
By the end of the Treatise, Berkeley has affirmed his religious purpose as a clergyman, to bring people to God, in this case by means of reason and philosophy and the contemplation of nature.
Related Titles
By George Berkeley
