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Iris Marion YoungA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
While Young acknowledges the contributions of Enlightenment ideals of liberty and political equality, she challenges the prevailing liberal concept of justice that defines liberation as “the elimination of group difference” (157), or assimilation. Advocates of assimilation argue that it eliminates arbitrary group-based distinctions and discrimination, provides a clear standard of equality, and maximizes the choices of individuals. Young rejects assimilation in favor of democratic cultural pluralism, with socially and culturally differentiated groups respecting and affirming one another in their differences and experiencing equality (163).
Young argues that a society without social groups is simply not possible. Formal equality has certainly not eliminated social differences, as society still defines members of oppressed groups as deviant. Therefore, to demand that equality and liberation ignore the differences of social groups has three oppressive consequences (164). First, the denial of difference “disadvantages groups whose experience, culture, and socialized capacities differ from those of privileged groups” (164). Members of such groups must measure up to the standards of the privileged. Secondly, this denial enables privileged groups to assume universality. It does not force privileged groups to recognize their specificity as, for example, Europeans or Christians. Thirdly, denying the reality of difference causes members of disadvantaged groups to loathe themselves for deviation from the biased standards. To reclaim a positive sense of identity, social groups need recognition and representation in policymaking. They need autonomy and self-organization.
Advocates of formal equality and assimilation fear that acknowledgment of differences will be used against disadvantaged groups, stigmatizing them as they were before the era of civil rights. Young wants to reconceptualize the idea of difference, which should not be absolute or exclusionary but rather relational, ambiguous, and shifting. A group’s identity is forged by “a social process of interaction and differentiation in which some people come to have a particular affinity for others” (172). Her call for group-specific rights and policies presumes the continuation of general civic and political rights of participation and inclusion. She uses the examples of women in the workplace, bilingual education of Latinos, and policies toward American Indians to demonstrate the need for differential treatment of groups. Pregnancy and childbirth do not fit into a gender-neutral category of disability, but instead are socially necessary work (175). Latinos need not surrender their language and culture to learn English. American Indians require special rights given the genocidal results of the application of an assimilationist ideal.
The fallacy of a unified public, which allows the perspective and interest of privileged groups to dominate, must give way to a democratic public that recognizes and represents all the oppressed and disadvantaged social groups within it (184). Its institutions and resources must support the “self-organization of group members so that they achieve collective empowerment and a reflective understanding” of their shared experience (184), group generation and analysis of policy proposals, and group veto power over policies that directly impact that group. Young defends this representation of oppressed groups by arguing that it promotes justice better than a system that denies difference. It is more likely to ensure both procedural fairness, as the current system produces policies that benefit the privileged, and “that all needs and interests in the public will be recognized in democratic deliberations” (185). Additionally, the expression of needs and interests will use “terms that appeal to justice” (185), not self-interests. The inclusion of more perspectives is likely to yield substantively better policies by maximizing social knowledge.
Young stipulates that she is not calling for the specific representation of interest or ideological groups—only social ones, and only those that are oppressed or disadvantaged. Such groups need not be represented proportionally to their numbers but must be given a meaningful voice. Women need not have 50% of the decision-making seats, but American Indians are entitled to more than a minuscule share. This representation must extend beyond governing institutions to any decision-making bodies that have authority over actions. Social justice requires democracy, which in turn demands group representation of oppressed and disadvantaged groups.
Young argues that affirmative action is better at counteracting current biases than remedying past discrimination. Such policies seek to increase the inclusion and participation of oppressed groups, yet the debate about affirmative action takes place within the paradigm of distributive justice. Even though affirmative action policies can award prestigious positions to women and members of other oppressed groups, they have only a “minor effect in altering the basic structure of group privilege and oppression” (199). In directing attention away from the lack of opportunity for most in these oppressed groups, the debate about affirmative action tends to support the status quo. Young criticizes two premises underlying the status quo: the hierarchical division of labor, which includes very few positions of power and prestige, and the distribution of such positions on the purported basis of merit.
The use of merit to award scarce positions would only be justifiable if qualifications were defined objectively and independently of culture and values, if the competencies required were job-related, and if performance and competence were judged individually and without cultural bias (201-02). Young considers this impossible. Most jobs are too complex to enable a precise measurement of performance, and individual contributions are often difficult to assess in collective outputs. Additionally, managerial or high-status positions often entail a great deal of leeway as to how the work is best completed. Those who evaluate workers are typically not “familiar with the work process” (203), further undermining the integrity of such merit ratings. In reality, the criteria of evaluation are value-based and culturally specific. More often than not, white men who are able-bodied and heterosexual evaluate the work of members of oppressed groups and bring to the table unconscious aversions and misunderstandings of cultural differences.
Educational attainments and standardized test results are commonly used to predict academic success and job performance. Yet standardized tests reflect values and culture and typically measure a limited set of aptitudes and skills. In reducing all persons to a common score of alleged intelligence, they define difference negatively. As white, middle-class men have usually authored these tests, women, people of color, and working-class people tend to have lower scores. Thus, the tests do not provide an accurate measure of “cognitive competence independent of and neutral with respect to values and culture” (210).
The processes of establishing criteria for positions and ranking qualifications are political. Given this, such criteria should be established democratically within a context of fairness. That context would require that the criteria be explicit and public and not exclude any social groups from consideration. Additionally, all applicants should enjoy consideration according to formal procedures that are publicized, and people with particular group affinities could receive preference, but only to undermine oppression or disadvantage (212). In the workplace, all workers should have input into general policies of hiring and a voice in the determination of criteria for their specific forms of work. In some cases, clients should have input into this hiring process as well.
Young considers a hierarchical division of labor—one with few winners and a distinction between task-defining and task-executing functions—to be unjust. Professionals, who receive higher pay and regulate entrance into their ranks, typically engage in task design. In designing tasks, they remove all autonomy and creativity from the executing function. This cheapens labor and renders it more easily subject to automation. Workers are left powerless, with “little or no authority or autonomy in most aspects of” life (219), especially work. They are told what to do and must act as “obedient subordinates, a stance that usually diminishes a sense of self” (221). Justice demands that people have the opportunity to develop and use skills. Most in the working class are therefore denied justice. To remedy this situation, workplace democracy is necessary. Employees must participate in the “basic decisions of the enterprise as a whole” and the “specific decisions that concern their specific work situation” (223). Workplace democracy reinforces governmental democracy. Young is not calling for the elimination of specialization or differential pay; rather, she seeks to eliminate the class division between professionals and nonprofessionals, ensuring greater mobility in the workforce and ending the special status of professionals in the form of status and prestige (225).
Political theorists must offer alternative visions of social relations. Several theorists have posited the ideal of community as an alternative to individualism, which assumes people to be “separate and self-contained atoms, each with the same formal rights, rights to keep others out, separate” (227). While Young agrees with the need for an alternative to liberalism and the distributive paradigm of justice, she rejects the communitarian alternative. Communitarian theorists assume a shared subjectivity, in which citizens understand others as they do themselves. There is a unity of purpose. Instead, Young argues that an individual subject is never fully present to themselves, let alone others. Communitarians celebrate face-to-face interaction and call for small, decentralized units of decision-making. While Young acknowledges that a good society should have institutional arrangements in place to accommodate small groups, she does not deem them suitable for society as a whole. She questions the impact on urban life and the way such small communities would relate to one another. Such a communitarian model excludes those who are different. In seeking a mutual identity, people naturally gravitate to those with whom they feel comfortable and away from those to whom they do not relate.
Politics, per Young, should be conceptualized as “a relationship of strangers who do not understand one another in a subjective and immediate sense, relating across time and distance” (234). She offers city life as an alternative vision of social relations that affirms group differences (227). People interact as strangers in cities yet experience belonging without a sense of oneness. Most have multiple group affiliations, some of which are with close friends and others which push them into the unfamiliar. Young presents four virtues of the unrealized potential of city life. First, there are social differences without exclusion. In fact, “social group differences flourish” (238), with group boundaries overlapping and open. Second, there is variety, as neighborhoods include parks, homes, and commercial centers. They are not single use, which is often isolating. Third, city life has an erotic dimension, which draws people from their routines to encounter something new and possibly causes them to lose their identities. Finally, city life offers publicity with space accessible to all. Such public spaces are critical for politics.
These are unrealized possibilities because cities are currently unjust. Domination and oppression are prevalent. Young blames this on corporate power, which is global in nature and disconnected to the needs of cities, as well as on the powerlessness of cities before state bureaucracies. Decision-making at the city level is depoliticized, with private groups making decisions behind closed doors on matters such as land use. Increasingly, urban space is segregated into single-use areas via zoning. That form of development makes life more difficult, particularly for women and oppressed social groups who have to spend time and money commuting.
To unleash the possibilities of city life, Young advocates large regional governments with mechanisms in place to represent neighborhoods and towns. A region is “the space across which people commonly travel to work, play, visit their friends, and take children on errands, the span of a day trip” (252). A region would include a city and its surrounding suburban and rural areas. All citizens should be empowered in these governments, meaning that they have a voice and a vote in making economic and political decisions. Individuals and groups would retain autonomy to make their own decisions without interference, but only when those decisions do not harm anyone else, do not inhibit the ability of others to develop and exercise their capacities, and do not determine conditions under which others are compelled to act (251). Young hopes that regions will promote liberty, minimize segregation and single-use areas, and foster public spaces.
Because Young considers theory to be socially and historically situated, her arguments are intended to apply to Western societies, especially the US. However, her theory has potential applicability internationally. She speculates on this possibility in the Epilogue and invites further research. It is important to go beyond the distributive questions to include ones about decision-making, the division of labor, and culture in both international relations and the internal politics of other countries. Domination and oppression are prevalent throughout the world. Indeed, affirming a “positive sense of group difference” and giving “specific representation to oppressed groups” might be the most important political issues per Young (259). She cites examples of ethnic minority movements in the Soviet Union, India and women’s movements. There is, she notes, a “resurgence of ethnicity within states that had claimed to transcend such differences as politically irrelevant” (260). Separate nations and states are additionally forming and strengthening institutions that bring them into greater cooperation without surrendering their identity. The European Union would be one example. Yet in many places, difference is still understood as “absolute otherness, with domination and violence the result” (260). Group differences form the background for violence throughout the world. Given these trends and realities, Young concludes that a politics that affirms group differences and represents oppressed groups has relevance beyond Western borders.
Young assumes that social groups are components of society and shape the identity of individuals. It is therefore a form of oppression to deny their existence and attempt to assimilate all into one group. To support her argument, Young at times invokes the literature of psychology in addition to other works in political theory. For example, she explains how the denial of difference for purposes of assimilation causes members of oppressed groups to loathe themselves for their deviation from the biased (but allegedly universal) standard of privileged groups. The application of an equal standard to all groups has the potential to result in injustice. Young supports differential treatment of oppressed groups, guaranteeing those groups a voice in representation. Young’s experience with the feminist movement helps to inform her call to respect differences. That movement initially gave precedence to the experiences of white, middle-class women but then recognized the need to diversify.
Young stipulates that members of all groups retain the rights associated with traditional liberalism, or the right to participate. Here Young distinguishes herself from some critical theorists and Marxists who reject such traditional rights. She seeks to build upon the progressive accomplishments of the Enlightenment, adding protections for oppressed groups while retaining allegiance to the equal entitlement of all to political participation. Using critical theory and psychological insights as tools and not roadmaps to follow in their entirety, she forges a unique contribution to the literature. One could question whether her acceptance of the notion of equality in this sense constitutes a universal principle of sorts. Marxists and some critical theorists have abandoned the very notion of justice. Young wants to reclaim and redefine it, as she recognizes the power it holds over the imagination. Her theory thus marries some traditional and radical concepts.
Yet Young is not only layering an added demand onto the distributive model of justice. Her goals and criticisms are more radical than that. In broadening the definition of politics to extend to any decision-making body that has authority over actions, she seeks to dramatically restructure the workplace and division of labor. Affirmative action is insufficient not because it treats groups differently, but because it leaves in place a hierarchical division of labor and a myth of meritocracy. The workplace, including the standards for hiring, must be democratized according to Young’s standard of justice. Here, Young proceeds to distinguish her argument from those of communitarians, many of whom also call for the democratization of the workplace and more participatory forms of democracy. Emphasizing the fact of difference, Young deems the goal of seeking a harmonious perspective as impossible. What is worse, it assumes that others can fully understand each other when individuals are not fully transparent even to themselves. Young invokes psychology to emphasize the significance of unconscious behaviors. People seek those with whom they are comfortable. Inevitably, then, the creation of small communities will be exclusive.
Although Young does not wish to offer a full theory of justice, she provides insights into alternative possibilities after exposing the problems with the current model of politics. Instead of idealizing decentralization and local government, Young ponders the virtues of urban life and imagines cosmopolitanism as a better political model. In calling for regional governments, she recognizes the false boundaries between cities and their surrounding suburbs and towns. Just as in the workplace, Young calls for democratic decision-making that ensures oppressed groups representation and a voice. She supports individual freedoms as well but redefines the public-private split. People can no longer interfere with the freedoms of others under the guise of their own liberty. For example, an employer is not at liberty to prescribe working conditions to people. While Young imagines new possibilities and offers a scathing critique of the injustice of the status quo, she is also calling political theorists to task for missing the most important issues of the day, oppression and domination, or injustice.
The decades since the publication of Justice and the Politics of Difference have presented new testimonies and challenges to Young’s ideas. Young was writing in the relatively early days of neoliberalism: a form of liberalism that harkens back to laissez-faire capitalism and advocates for the rolling back of the modern welfare state. In the US and many other countries, this philosophy dismantled much of the capitalist welfare state as Young describes it. At the same time, members of oppressed groups (particularly women) have come to enjoy greater representation across various sectors of society. This arguably makes Young’s critique of programs like affirmative action all the more relevant, as the expansion of representation has not coincided with the kind of systemic changes Young advocates for. Meanwhile, developments like Brexit—the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union—raise new questions about the relationship between regionalism and universalism. While one could argue that such events prove Young’s vision of cooperation across difference unworkable, the counterpoint is, again, that they take place within a context in which the underlying flaws and contradictions of liberalism continue to go unaddressed.