On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society

In the Vietnam War, the firing rate increased to 90-95% from the 15-20% rate in World War II. This increase came at a psychological cost, especially because returning soldiers were condemned and attacked at home. New methods of training accounted for the increased firing rate. Soldiers are desensitized to killing in boot camps, as they are encouraged to chant “kill, kill, kill” (253), among other things.

Next, Pavlovian and Skinnerian conditioning is used to get soldiers to associate killing with positive reinforcements, such as merit badges and weekend passes. The soldier spends hours in a fox hole and shoots to kill targets, which look like humans, when they pop up. Since the soldier has rehearsed killing so many times, there is a sense of deniability when that soldier kills. It does not feel any different than shooting at a target.

Grossman compares the British soldiers, trained with these methods, and the Argentinian ones, who were not so trained, in the Falklands War. The British were highly effective, while the Argentinians were not. In fact, the training has been so effective that soldiers who have not killed but participated in combat nonetheless share in the guilt of killing. Grossman highlights the important safeguard about such training: Soldiers only fire under orders in combat.

The stage of rationalization of killing and acceptance did not take place for the veterans of the Vietnam War. These processes involve several components. There should be “constant praise and assurance to the soldier from peers and superiors” (265) that the soldier acted correctly. Mature comrades serve as role models and help to stabilize the personality as well (265). In Vietnam, the combatants as well as their commanders were young. Soldiers did not receive praise and support.

The rationalization and acceptance processes are also aided by a “careful adherence to codes and conventions of warfare” (265) that limits civilian casualties. Vietnam, in contrast, was a dirty war, with women and children dressed in civilian clothes purportedly engaged in combat. When soldiers killed these individuals, they felt shame. Past wars had “clearly defined safe areas” (266) where soldiers could go to relax. There were no such zones in Vietnam.

Soldiers are aided psychologically by the presence of close friends who are with them through training and combat (266). In Vietnam, this was not the case. It was a war of individuals who arrived alone, stayed for one year, and left alone. There was limited bonding. While the short stays kept psychological casualties on the battlefield low, there was a long-term price. Soldiers are assisted in the rationalization process by a “cooldown period” shared with comrades before returning from war. There was no such period for Vietnam veterans, who were flown home individually. Vietnam was also the first “pharmacological war” (272), with some soldiers prescribed tranquilizers and others self-medicating with drugs. These treatments simply delayed combat stress reactions.

Soldiers can rationalize killings more easily when their sacrifices have brought about victory. This was not the case in Vietnam, as the South ultimately fell. Finally, soldiers are aided in the grief process by a warm welcome home, with parades celebrating their service. They can proudly display medals and keep in touch with comrades from the war. None of this happened for Vietnam veterans. Instead, they were met with a hostile environment, sometimes physically attacked and spat upon, and called murderers. In response, they repressed their feelings, and the trauma of killing was magnified.

PTSD, defined as “a reaction to a psychologically traumatic event outside the range of normal experience” (285), can occur years after combat. Symptoms are varied but can include social withdrawal, difficulty with relationships, and sleep difficulties (285), and they can last for years.

Of the 2.8 million people who served in Vietnam, 18-54% suffer from PTSD. One study concluded that the Vietnam veterans who have PTSD are almost entirely those who saw high-intensity combat: “These veterans suffer far higher incidence of divorce, marital problems, tranquilizer use, alcoholism, joblessness, heart disease, high blood pressure, and ulcers” (286). Grossman argues that if a society conditions soldiers to kill and then orders them to do so, that society has an obligation to help soldiers deal with these psychological repercussions.

It is not only those soldiers who killed that suffer from PTSD but also soldiers who supported the killings via the performance of enabling tasks. Two factors determine the magnitude of PTSD, namely the intensity of the initial trauma and the social support offered to the traumatized individual, and they do so in a multiplicative relationship. Via the examination of two hypothetical soldiers from World War II and Vietnam, Grossman explains that a soldier from World War II who had experienced an intense trauma, but then received strong social support, is less likely to have PTSD than a Vietnam veteran, who experienced low trauma but faced a hostile home environment and lack of social support.

In spite of the societal mistreatment of Vietnam veterans, they have done remarkably well. Nonetheless, 400,000 to 1.5 million have PTSD from the war. While the military has made soldiers more likely to kill via conditioning, it has not given soldiers the psychological tools to handle the burden of killing.

The Weinberger Doctrine, named for President Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, recognizes the high price of sending soldiers into combat. The doctrine requires that troops not be sent in the absence of vital US interests, and even then, only as a last resort. When troops are committed, they must be sufficient in number and support to win, and objectives must be clearly defined. Additionally, the doctrine demands that troops not be sent without support from the American people and Congress (296). Grossman additionally recommends that the military ensure unit integrity during and after combat to allow soldiers to bond with one another and support each other. Families, commanders, and society also must provide the soldiers with assurance and support.

Grossman ends this section with a personal note, emphasizing the high psychological cost paid by combat soldiers “who went to do the incomprehensibly difficult job their nation sent them to do and did it proudly, did it well, and all too often did it thanklessly” (299). He tells their stories to help society better understand their suffering and sacrifice.