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The first three chapters of this work establish what Aristotle considers to be the fundamental elements of rhetoric: the types of proof, their appropriate use, and the types of oratory.
In Chapter 1, Aristotle defines Rhetoric through comparison with Dialectic, the method of philosophical debate. He states that everyone uses both Rhetoric and Dialectic, since everyone at some point speaks “to sift or to support theses, and to defend or attack persons” (1). Both are skills that don’t pertain to a particular subject, and both are often practiced by those who have no training. A purpose of the book is to lay out a useable method for Rhetoric.
Aristotle targets the shortcomings of other treatises on Rhetoric. These other works, he argues, focus only on how to succeed through emotional manipulation. They also primarily teach skills for forensic oratory, neglecting the other forms of persuasive speech (especially deliberative oratory). Aristotle sets out to teach Rhetoric correctly, through evidence-based persuasion and encompassing all sorts of oratory.
The second chapter begins with a succinct definition of Rhetoric: “[T]he faculty of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion” (7). Aristotle turns now to listing these means of persuasion. He separates proofs into ‘artistic’ (dependent upon the skill of the speaker) and ‘non-artistic’ (unaffected by the speaker’s skill or lack thereof). Non-artistic proofs include “witnesses, admissions under torture, written contracts, and the like” (8). Artistic proofs can be either the ethos (character) of the speaker; the pathos (emotion) of the audience; or logos (logical argument).
The most important of these means to Aristotle is the third, logical argument, and he divides it into two sub-categories: example and enthymeme. Examples use the specific to draw general conclusions, through induction. Enthymemes, a form of syllogism, use general statements to draw specific conclusions through deduction. Aristotle further divides enthymemes into probabilities and signs. The sign (Greek tekmērion)is the only irrefutable form of argument.
Aristotle tells us that enthymemes are derived from topoi (singular topos), or lines of argument. Topoi can be either universal, or they can pertain to a specific subject or science. Since certain topoi are suited to different kinds of oratory, we must first learn about the three kinds of oratory.
The first is deliberative, speeches of advice generally delivered in the government assembly. The second style is forensic, speeches of prosecution and defense delivered in the law courts. The third form is epideictic, speeches of praise or blame generally delivered in a ceremonial setting. Deliberative concerns the future, forensic concerns the past, and epideictic concerns the present. Aristotle concludes this chapter with a brief summary of the principles that have been established so far.
Having outlined the three forms of oratory, Aristotle focuses more closely on deliberative first. He makes it clear that his concern is not with political science—“the usual subjects of public business and deliberation” (20)—but he must still enumerate the topics that generally excite public debate about the future. These topics are: ways and means; war and peace; defense of the country; exports and imports; and legislation. Anyone advising the state on the first four topics must have an adequate understanding of them.
Chapter 5 deals with the issue of Happiness, which is an important consideration in deliberative oratory: “And whatever produces happiness [...] must needs be done; while whatever destroys or hinders happiness [...] must needs be left undone” (24). There are 13 constituent parts of happiness: nobility; children; wealth; fame or good repute; honor; health; beauty; strength; size; a good old age; friends; good fortune or luck; and virtue.
The deliberative speaker can apply this knowledge of happiness to determining what, to their audience, is considered “good” or expedient in the circumstances. Aristotle defines “good” as “that which is chosen in and for itself; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or that which is desired by all beings, or by all sentient beings” (30). There are nine goods: virtues, such as courage; health and beauty; wealth; friendship; honor and reputation; power in speaking and acting; natural mental ability; life; and justice. Aristotle then enumerates the factors that different people in different circumstances would consider “good”—the implicit lesson being that the speaker must judge what their audience would consider most expedient.
The following chapter considers at length the degrees of goodness or expediency, outlining the many ways to compare good things and determine which is greater. The purpose of this discussion is to give the speaker points of reference when advising their listeners.
To conclude his initial discussion of deliberative oratory, Aristotle lists the four types of government known in his day. They are democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and monarchy: “The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the promotion of discipline, and the institutions of the State; of tyranny (a form of monarchy), self-protection” (45). Although he does not examine them in great detail, the author advises his reader to become familiar with the characters and priorities of whatever government they are dealing with.
Whereas deliberative was concerned with advice, epideictic oratory is concerned with praise and blame. Praise depends on factors such as nobility and virtue. Aristotle defines “the noble” as “that which is desirable in and for itself, and also wins praise; or is that which is good, and also pleasant because good” (46). Virtue is noble, then, and Aristotle identifies nine elements of virtue: justice; courage; temperance; magnificence; magnanimity; liberality; gentleness; prudence; and wisdom. With these basic principles, the author enumerates noble events and qualities that one may experience or possess. With this understanding, Aristotle advises the reader on ways to represent qualities in their best light: “Thus a cautious man may be represented as cold and designing, a simpleton as good-natured, a callous man as easy-going” (50).
Aristotle compares the core considerations of epideictic oratory and deliberative, and concludes that they are essentially the same; the goods that one advises in deliberative oratory are essentially the same qualities that one praises in epideictic.
Aristotle now moves to forensic oratory, which constitutes both accusation and defense. There are three bases for the speaker’s arguments: motives for wrongdoing; state of mind; and “the kinds of persons who are wronged, and their situation” (55). He also establishes that there are two kinds of law: written and “universal” (or unwritten). Both are worthy of consideration in forensic speeches.
Regarding motive, Aristotle identifies seven causes of action: chance; nature; compulsion; habit; reason; passion; and desire. Different characteristics and circumstances can affect the likelihood of someone acting from these causes: “All actions which men do of themselves are either good or apparently good, or else pleasant or apparently pleasant” (59). Motive must arise from some sort of benefit.
The second element to be considered in forensic oratory (after motive, discussed above) is the state of mind (that is, the character and circumstances) of the perpetrator and victim. There are many conditions in which people could commit crimes, such as when they are in need or out of habit. As for victims of crimes, they could broadly be identified as those who form an easy target or who stand between the perpetrator and their pleasure. For example, poor public speakers are likely to become victims because they cannot take action effectively in court.
Aristotle moves from victim and wrongdoer to a closer examination of just and unjust acts. Injustice can be a violation of either written laws or universal laws: “For there is a natural and universal notion of right and wrong, one that all men instinctively apprehend” (73). In arguing that a crime has occurred, it is important for the speaker to show that the act was accompanied by malicious intent in violation of the law.
Unwritten law is based on consideration of virtue and vice as well as equity. These considerations allow juries, the audience of forensic speeches, to interpret the generalities in written laws and apply them reasonably to specific situations. Aristotle further explains that there are varying degrees of wrongness in crimes, depending on such factors as circumstances, malice, and possibility of redress. The forensic speaker can magnify crimes by emphasizing these attendant factors.
To conclude Book 1, Aristotle turns to what he calls the “non-artistic” proofs, or objective evidence. The five non-artistic proofs are: laws; witnesses; contracts; torture; and oaths. When dealing with laws, Aristotle advises methods of downplaying or disputing unfavorable laws and emphasizing favorable ones. He identifies two kinds of witness, ancient and recent.
Ancient witnesses are respected ancient writers who can be quoted on the general topic at hand. Recent witnesses can either be respected thinkers who have recently opined on the topic at hand or people involved in the issue at hand. For contracts, as with laws, the author outlines methods of exaggerating or downplaying their relevance depending on their favorability. Torture is a form of evidence particular to ancient Athens; it was believed that the testimony of slaves was only trustworthy if extracted through torture. Aristotle advises the speaker either to emphasize this principle or to argue that people will say anything to end their torture, depending on the evidence provided. Finally, Aristotle explains the function of swearing an oath: essentially, the speaker may offer to swear an oath to prove his honesty, and/or he may request an oath from his opponent if he believes that the opponent is lying. Aristotle concludes by outlining arguments that one may construct around these oaths.
Book 1, like the following two books of this work, is typical of Aristotle’s style in instructional treatises. Beginning with a broad topic (rhetoric), he breaks it down into its constituent parts (the styles of rhetoric, proofs, etc.), and breaks those parts down further (virtues and vices, forms of non-artistic proofs, etc.). As the author explains: “[W]hen the practised and the spontaneous speaker gain their end, it is possible to investigate the cause of their success; and such an inquiry, we shall all admit, performs the function of an art” (1). The result is a thorough and detailed examination of rhetoric, but one that can be difficult to follow as topics shift abruptly and the logical progression is not always evident.
An understanding of the historical context in which Aristotle wrote can help to clarify the importance of this work and his reasons for arranging his discussion the way he did. Aristotle (384-322 BCE) lived in the final decades of the Athenian radical democracy, which had existed for roughly 100 years before his birth. In this system, all adult male citizens of the Athenian city-state had the right (and obligation) to participate fully in law and government. In lieu of representatives, all citizens had the right to sit in their government assembly and vote on laws and important state decisions. Similarly, the juries in Athenian law-courts were selected by lot and could comprise as many as 1,500 jurors. Most government officials were chosen by lot, as well. All male Athenian citizens had the right to speak in the government assembly, and they had to speak for themselves in court (that is, they had no legal representation).
This system of active participation placed a massive importance upon public speaking, since nearly all major legal and political decisions depended upon a speaker’s ability to persuade an audience of ordinary citizens. This necessity gave birth to the study of rhetoric at Athens.
Given the structure of Athenian democracy, Aristotle forms an elegant three-part distinction between the forms of speaking. Deliberative oratory, taking place in the government assembly, is intended to advise an audience of thousands of Athenians on matters ranging from legislation to declarations of war. As Aristotle says, this form concerns the future. Forensic oratory takes place in the Athenian law-courts, before an audience of hundreds of jurors, as the speaker must make accusations and defenses on his own behalf or that of his dependents. This form concerns the past; whether events did or did not transpire. Epideictic oratory, which generally takes place at ceremonial gatherings such as state funerals, concerns the praise or blame of people or events. This style concerns the present, and it receives the least attention from Aristotle. Although the stakes of epideictic oratory are lower than those of the other two, it can still be an important tool for influencing public opinion and morale.
The circumstances of Athens’s radical democracy also explain why Aristotle focuses on persuasive tools from the perspective of a non-expert in law or political science. The speaker and his audience, in many cases, would not be experts in either field, but rather casual participants: “True instruction, by the method of logic, is here impossible; the speaker must frame his proofs and arguments with the help of common knowledge and accepted opinions” (6). An ability to anticipate the audience’s values and to manipulate the interpretation of evidence becomes more important than it would if the audience were a small group of informed listeners.
Book 1 has laid out a general outline of the principles and basic divisions in his rhetorical method. The next two books will build upon these foundations and elaborate on the rhetorical tools available to the speaker.
By Aristotle