The Myth of the Eternal Return

Section 3 of Chapter 3, “Cosmic Cycles and History,” is a prolonged discussion of the titular theme of the book: the myth of the eternal return, especially as it is expressed in archaic cosmology. He begins by making the key distinction between the archaic experience of time and the modern conception. This is the distinction between cyclical and finite, or linear, time. Archaic peoples experienced time cyclically, meaning that the universe underwent periodic cycles of degeneration and regeneration in an endless process of decay and growth. The modern conception, on the other hand, views time as finite. He calls finite time “a fragment between two atemporal eternalities” (112). Finite time is situated between two abysses, and it does not repeat itself but instead progresses ever forward toward an end.

Eliade develops his theory via a number of archaic examples, particularly the ancient Indian idea of the yuga, or age/epoch. According to the Indian system, the world is currently in the Kali Yuga, an age of darkness. Even in this dark age, it is still possible for particular individuals to reach enlightenment; it is not an era of hopelessness, even if it is relatively dark. Each yuga transitions into another in an endless cycle. He develops a distinction between the “Vedic” Hindu conception of cosmic cycles and the Mahayanic, or Buddhistic conception. For the former, the cosmic cycles reflect a meaningful connection to divine archetypes; for the latter, this very connection is symbolic of servitude. One might keep in mind the Buddhist concept of Nirvana as a state free from suffering. This is the difference in the desire to give suffering meaning and the desire to escape or transcend the state of suffering. To a degree this difference mirrors the difference between most archaic ontologies and the Hebrew conception of Yahweh. Buddhism and Judeo-Christianity, then, function as intermediate positions between the vastly oppositional archaic and modern understandings of time, being, and suffering. In another sense, the Mayahanic position directly mirrors the modern existentialist view (117).

He goes on to discuss Greco-Roman and Iranian conceptions of cyclical time. This includes engagement with Plato, Heraclitus, and Stoic philosophy. Plato’s highly developed and abstract philosophy ultimately turned back to myth. In this Greco-Roman context, a common form of the myth of eternal return is “the myth of universal conflagration” (123). This is the idea that the world will perish in an enormous fire and be born anew in the ruins. According to Eliade, this was a consolation. As was also the case in the Indian traditions, there is hope for those who are pure of heart, or morally righteous. They may survive the fire (or flood) and build the world again in the new age. The Iranian and Judeo-Christian understanding of the world ends with an apocalyptic end to history, which does away with the eternal cycle. However, it cannot totally defeat the myth of eternal return. This myth continues to crop up. The myth of eternal return is not even purged from Christianity. Eliade writes,

Indeed, the Christian liturgical year is based upon a periodic and real repetition of the Nativity, Passion, death, and Resurrection of Jesus, with all that this mystical drama implies for a Christian; that is, personal and cosmic regeneration through actualization in concreto of the birth, death and resurrection of the Saviour (130).

The fact that the “mystical drama” is repeated every year seems to imply that even in a religion with a cosmology diametrically opposed to eternal return, the myth of eternal return continues to grip its practitioners. Eliade never explicitly explains why, but he frequently highlights ways in which the myth of eternal return, so fundamental to archaic ontology, is never completely transcended. Given that Eliade emphasizes the “instructive” nature of this myth and has dedicated this book to explicating the value of archaic ontology, there may be strong evolutionary psychological reasons for the myth’s omnipresence.

In the final section of Chapter 3, “Destiny and History,” Eliade once more asks how it is that history, with all its suffering and misery, has been tolerated. The question of “historical destiny” is intricately interwoven with the answer a people provides for its place in the cosmos. He engages with the history of Rome, especially in the social anxiety around the eventual collapse of the city. In Rome, Eliade points to a “supreme effort to liberate history from astral destiny or from the law of cosmic cycles” (136). This attempt at a liberated historical destiny, though, was not an escape from the myth of eternal return, because Rome imagined its own endless renewal. Rome, in this view, sought to shape the eternal return in its own favor, wresting it away from independent cosmic forces. Eliade concludes this chapter by once again noting the Christian escape from the pattern of eternal return: In Christianity, especially through the experience of faith, the myth of eternal return is transcended, and a new form of historical destiny emerges.