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Mircea Eliade, Transl. Willard R. TraskA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
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A distinctive element of Eliade’s work is the central role of temporality and eternity in the spiritual practices and ontological beliefs of human behavior. In archaic ritual, Judeo-Christian messianic faith, and modern philosophy of history, humanity’s relationship to time is radically different. These varying relationships to time both indicate and are integral to entirely opposed worldviews. In a sense, the entirety of the way in which the world is revealed to different persons at different times changes via the way people relate to time. At no point in this discussion does Eliade conduct a philosophical or ontological inquiry to discover the true nature of time. Eliade did not write a philosophical treatise defending the reality of a conception of time. As a historian of religious ideas, he presents the ontological, mythological, and philosophical ideas of archaic (and modern) communities and individuals. He evaluates these ideas based on their practical merit, not on a particular philosophical orientation.
For archaic humanity, time was divided into two fundamental components: the sacred and the profane, concepts explored predominantly in the first chapter of The Myth. At sacred times (during rites, ceremonies, the new year, etc.) the members of a community were united with divine archetypes in a creative rearticulation of endlessly repeating cosmic actions. The sacred dimension of life lifted “archaic man” out of the mundane reality of daily life (profane time) and oriented him toward the creative power of the cosmos. Time did not progress toward any cumulative end, nor was it meaningful except in relationship to the presence of divine transcendence. The nature of reality in the archaic model reiterates the power of mythical, archetypal influences for all of eternity. These are recreated at definite intervals by a community that seeks to align itself with this cosmic rhythm.
Eliade posits this archaic ontology against two other forms of philosophical relationship to time: the Judeo-Christian experience of faith and the modern, historicist conception of linear, finite time. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, especially through the experience of faith, time builds toward a culminating moment of apocalypse and salvation. There is an abyss of eternity before the creation of the world, and there is another eternity after the end of the cosmic drama. Historical events do not have meaning in relation to endlessly repeating divine archetypes. Instead, they can be seen as instances of divine will, and their implications understood through reference to individual faith in God. Through this faith, the individual is put into relation to a transcendent power—whatever that power may be—and thereby lifted out of their everyday situation. Like the archaic ontology embodied in the myth of eternal return, the faithful can understand the meaning of history by understanding its connection to transcendent powers. Specific moments in time—be they of personal significance or extreme social impact—can be understood through an appeal to God’s will.
The modern, historicist viewpoint cannot do this, and, in fact, some versions explicitly reject this approach. The historicist approach does not view any moments in time as embodying any transcendent power, be it an archetypal hero or monotheistic Godhead. The historicist approach—which tends to be (but is not necessarily) materialistic and atheistic—denies the reality of meaning outside of historical reality. It must therefore give this meaning to historical reality itself. For instance, a particularly important event will not be seen as an instance of God’s will, nor part of God’s masterplan, nor an expression of archetypal creation. Instead, its meaning may refer to some future time, like the communist utopia, or the reestablishment of an empire, etc. (in studies of the philosophy of history, this “future time” is often called the eschaton). In some cases, it has no meaning beyond its own factual existence. According to Eliade, this view leads to despair. It denies spiritual relationship to something transcendent and therefore strips humans of a deeply meaningful connection and, in the final analysis (as he likes to say), their freedom.
Perhaps Eliade’s singular moral and practical purpose for composing The Myth of the Eternal Return is to sketch the contours of an ontological or spiritual orientation diametrically opposed to the modern philosophy of history. This is not to forge an outright attack of modern philosophy, but rather to demonstrate the value of an alternative (or alternatives) to such a mindset. One alternative is, as we know, the myth of eternal return and the practices of archaic humanity. The other alternative, more amenable to the modern world, is the experience of faith.
Eliade believes that suffering is not only a part of human life but that it will never be totally transcended. Because of this, humans will always find ways to interpret suffering, pain, loss, and injury. To handle the crushing magnitude of trauma, suffering must be granted some kind of meaning. For Eliade, to find suffering meaningful is to wrest it from the absurdity and pointlessness to which it is otherwise subject. Meaningless suffering is not simply a burden to bear; it is utterly intolerable. It is the spur of despair. On the mantle of despair rests Eliade’s most pointed criticism of modern philosophies of history and their political movements, including Marxism, liberalism, and fascism. Each of these—and more philosophically abstract systems, too, like Hegel’s—are (at least in Eliade’s eyes) irreligious, without proper sense of the sacred. This lack of closeness to the divinity of being makes the presence of suffering appear meaningless, or only meaningful in relation to a distant possibility. This inculcates despair and hopelessness, filling life with misery; Eliade thus considers the loss of the sacred a major ethical problem. When suffering lacks recognized meaning, suffering multiplies.
In contrast to this, archaic ontology situates suffering within a narrative of readily apparent (or at least readily intuited) meaning. This is not to say that archaic ontologies are true, especially in the sense of factual accuracy about the material constitution of the world. It is to say, however, that these ontologies have practical value. The elaborate mythologies of archaic ontologies are often internally inconsistent, mutually exclusive, and may appear (to modern Western humanity) childishly bizarre. Even so, worlds governed by divine law in which right action is easily prescribed can provide a stabilizing sense of structure; they can provide meaning to suffering and, in some cases, may even welcome it: “How has man tolerated history?” Eliade asks (130). “The answer,” he writes, “is discernible in each individual system: His very place in the cosmic cycle—whether that cycle be capable of repetition or not—lays upon man a certain historical destiny” (130). For Eliade, the nature of this historical destiny, and humanity’s relationship to it, determines whether suffering will be meaningless and thereby lead to despair, or whether it will be meaningful, as is the case for the faithful and the pagan.
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