The Power Elite

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1956

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Summary

Background

Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapters 1-4

Chapters 5-7

Chapters 8-10

Chapters 11-12

Chapters 13-15

Key Figures

Themes

Index of Terms

Important Quotes

Essay Topics

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Discussion Questions

Chapters 13-15Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 13 Summary: “The Mass Society”

In the American mind, the public drives policy: There is free expression, with issues debated and no one group monopolizing discussion. Out of such discussion, rationality and truth prevail. This belief, Mills notes, is a “fairy tale” (300). The major and consequential issues are neither raised nor debated by the public at large. Indeed, the classic community of publics, idealized in earlier centuries, is being transformed to a society of masses. The US is not yet a mass society, but it is trending in that direction. Mass societies and publics are distinguished in four ways. First, in a public, the ratio of givers of opinion to receivers is almost equal, while in a mass society, far fewer people express than receive opinions. Second, there is an opportunity to respond to opinions in a public. In contrast, there is virtually no opportunity for an individual to respond with any impact in a mass society. Third, public opinion, formed via discussion, is the basis for effective action in a public, while authorities control actions in a mass society. Finally, there is no autonomy from institutions in a mass society, as they penetrate the masses and eliminate its ability to form an opinion via discussion. Authoritative institutions do not penetrate a public, which operates autonomously (303-4). In short, a mass society transforms the public into media markets that are manipulated.

Although the US is not yet a mass society, Mills observes the parallels between economic developments and the power of public opinion. Just as the small store was replaced by the corporation, mass advertising substitutes for word of mouth. Indeed, all the trends contributing to the demise of politicians and the theory of balance work to push the public toward a mass society. One critical development in this process is “the decline of the voluntary association as a genuine instrument of the public” (306). Instead, institutions are now larger, more centralized, and administrative. These large interest groups, or voluntary associations, are the mediators between the power elite and individual citizens. Yet such associations are less accessible to individuals; therefore, the gap between leaders of these associations and members widens. As a result, decisions are sold to the masses, and the individual within the mass is left without any sense of political belonging.

While impersonal trends contributed to the move toward a mass society, elites work to control, manage, manipulate, and intimidate the public (310). To hold and obtain power, political, economic, and military elites attempt to influence public opinion. Mass media and compulsory education are the two most impactful ways of doing this. Mills explains that the media facilitate a “psychological illiteracy” by defining the identity of individuals, naming their aspirations and ways to achieve them, and dictating their feelings. People obtain their sense of reality not from experience but from media stereotypes. What is more, television works to prevent discussions and offers distraction. With public relations experts manipulating the public, the elite class rules in obscurity without public legitimation. The media does not provide context and obscures the public's understanding of power relations.

The compulsory system of education became vocational; its emphasis is economic, not political. Students are not given the tools to question the big picture; instead, they are fed trivia and occupational training. Increasingly, people do not have the intellectual or experiential means to transcend their narrow lives. In big cities, they know one another only as functionaries in given roles. In almost every area of life, they are submerged into a “personal milieu” (321) and do not have the capability to see the whole. Indeed, even personal experiences are formed into stereotypes. As a result, the individual becomes entirely dependent on the media, unable to formulate desires. There is a complete loss of political will and no possibility of realizing any such will. Such a mass society enables a power elite to operate, and—unlike the middle and working classes—the upper class becomes increasingly unified.

Chapter 14 Summary: “The Conservative Mood”

In the mid-20th century US, a conservative mood took hold, which Mills posits allows individuals “to accept public depravity without any sense of outrage” (326) and abandon the idea of controlling fate via human reason. Classical conservatism defends tradition or irrationality against reason. Mills explains that it results in the acceptance of the leadership of some men who are deemed an elite. Yet, in the US, there is no such elite that conforms to ideals of conservative excellence or with a suitable ideology. Material success alone is the only basis of authority. Thus, the American elite invokes public relations, not ideology, to win acceptance.

Yet the conservative mood is almost as strong as the appeal of liberal rhetoric. In fact, postwar liberalism was weakened and transformed into administrative routines. It does not offer aspirations. Its rhetorical victory left it devoid of meaning. Liberalism is increasingly irrelevant and an inaccurate description of American society. Because of the dominance of liberal terms, however, elite powers have no need to offer or defend a truly conservative ideology. The elite tier is not forced to justify its rule.

The combination of a conservative mood and liberal rhetoric makes thought irrelevant. At middle levels of power, petty conservatives and liberals make noise; on the upper level, more sophisticated conservatives have power. That elite group makes decisions in accordance with its interests, not with the benefit of public debate or ideology. Thus, knowledge is divorced from power. Although Americans distrust the upper class or the elite, they do so without any doctrinal or political focus. Instead, they accept the corporate rich with cynicism, and the power elite rule without responsibility or ideas.

Chapter 15 Summary: “The Higher Immorality”

The corporate rich have not had to win the moral consent of the citizenry. With money the only criterion for success, the wealthy pursue it ruthlessly. As they assume positions in the political elite, they carry such habits into government and use public office for private gain. Older values and moral codes were displaced and not replaced.

Entry into the elite is not based on merit or knowledge. Those in the elite select younger men to pull into their circles who are obsequious. Indeed, Mills argues, if lists of the top 100 individuals of the greatest knowledge and those with the greatest power were compiled, there would be little, if any, overlap between the two groups. The power elite tier is not in touch with the cultural elite tier either. Mills observes that a democracy requires a knowledgeable public and leaders who are somewhat responsive to it, but neither is present in the US in the mid-20th century. Instead, the elite class makes policies and decisions without justification or public debate. The expansion of official secrets contributed to this practice. As a result, public relations replaces reason; increasingly, public communications assumes the form of commercial propaganda.

The immorality of accomplishment, organized irresponsibility, and the expulsion of the mind from public affairs resulted in literate Americans' sensing something false about the elite. Yet that group identifies itself with the historical greatness of the institutions that it now dominates. Seeking status, members of the power elite compete with celebrities, who have “publicity without power” (359). The celebrity offers the mass public a form of status distraction, and postwar prosperity provides economic distraction. Meanwhile, liberal intellectuals focus on middle levels of power and are politically distracted. Thus, the power of the higher circles is obscured. This leaves the US without true leaders, as the American elite class "is not composed of representative [individuals] whose conduct and character constitute models for [...] imitation or aspiration" (360). The nation irrationality become “a naked and arbitrary power” (360).

Chapters 13-15 Analysis

The role of the citizenry declined in the process of transformation to a mass society. Instead of participating in public life via voluntary associations and policy debates, citizens are becoming spectators. They are not interacting with others in debates and exchanging opinions; rather, they receive political news with no opportunity to respond to it. The 1950s ushered in the era of television to American homes. This medium is well-suited to this transformation. Television not only allows for one-way communication; it also simplifies messages and distracts viewers from politics by offering them entertainment and celebrities. Additionally, it keeps people home alone, away from meeting places where they interact with others and share opinions.

Individuality becomes lost in mass culture. Mass media define reality, and an individual’s identity becomes stereotyped and conformist. Arthur Miller's play The Death of a Salesman, which was popular in the 1950s, captures this sense of loss of identity. Television programming additionally facilitated this loss of individual authenticity, as people saw their own identities defined by stereotypes. Mills claims that mass media define the goals and aspirations of people in materialistic terms. There is no encouragement to challenge the system or to find fulfillment in meaningful work.

Some argued that the end of ideology was at hand, leaving no role for the public to choose public policies. In The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (1962), Daniel Bell maintains that the ends of politics were a given at this point in history, and experts were seen as the best at determining the means to achieve those purposes. Individuals were disconnected from public life. As even advocacy groups expanded in size, there was no opportunity to give input and to be part of a greater whole. The citizenry was losing control over its fate, having surrendered it to authorities or experts. Education, though it was increasing, was not helpful in empowering individuals; it did not encourage independent thought and critical questioning but focused on providing vocational training, sustaining capitalism.

Despite all this distraction and loss of political power, some people, such as Mills, had a sense that the emperor wore no clothes. The power elite, who made the consequential decisions, had no authority to make such decisions. Its members did not attain their status because of their merit or values. Their power was not justified via classical conservatism, which upholds rule by an aristocracy of cultured and competent individuals. Nor would liberal philosophy allow for the rule of the few arbitrarily, as that tradition values political equality. Instead, Mills critiques the elite class for lacking ideology and simply ruling in favor of its economic interests.