The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany

Hitler’s significant miscalculations, fueled by his megalomaniac insistence on micromanaging every aspect of the war, are the highlights of Chapters 23-26. For instance, Admiral Raeder tried to convince Hitler to focus on destroying the British in the Mediterranean, but the Fuehrer was fixated on the Soviet Union, and “to the bitter end he would stick fanatically to this fundamental strategy” (819). Even then, however, Hitler could not control his mounting rage when, with disastrous consequences for his armed forces, he postponed Operation Barbarossa by four crucial weeks so that he “might vent his personal spite” against Yugoslavia (824). In late 1942, following reversals in North Africa and the Soviet Union, Nazi leaders began to unravel. A “change” in Hitler, a “corrosion, a deterioration” had “set in,” as it had with Goering, who “was becoming more and more attached to his jewels and his toy trains” (923). Shirer works to create a picture of Hitler and his closest entourage as unstable and spiraling out of control. Hitler’s decisions to delay his attack on the USSR does support this image, as any tactician working within the objective realities of the Russian winter and the sheer size of the Russian army would not have logically chosen to begin an attack so late in the season. Likewise, Shirer’s depiction of Hitler’s decision to attack Yugoslavia first is one of pure emotion, and a picture of an emotional and irrational leader begins to take shape.

The same declining judgment marred Hitler’s diplomacy as well as his conceptions of grand strategy. The Fuehrer held strange and contradictory attitudes toward the US: “contempt for her military prowess” yet determination to keep her out of the war (871). Likewise, for reasons that “defy logic and understanding,” Hitler guaranteed Japan’s security against the US without demanding reciprocity in his struggle with the Soviet Union (892). In his declaration of war on the US, Hitler attacked President Roosevelt and appealed to certain groups in America whose members believed that Roosevelt’s New Deal had failed, thus proving himself “ignorant of the fact that on Pearl Harbor Day these groups, like all others in America, had rallied to the support of their country” (899).

Soviet behavior on the eve of Barbarossa also makes little sense. As early as July 1940, according to Generals Halder and Jodl, Hitler had decided to attack the Soviet Union and hoped to do it as soon as possible. Amid reports of impending attack, however, Stalin remained complacent, showing “staggering smugness” and “abysmal ignorance” (796). Furthermore, Stalin aside, it is:

[A]lmost inconceivable but nevertheless true that the men in the Kremlin, for all the reputation they had of being suspicious, crafty, and hardheaded, and despite all the evidence and all the warnings that stared them in the face, did not realize right up to the last moment that they were to be hit, and with a force which would almost destroy their nation (846).

Shirer’s bafflement at the behavior and decisions of all these leaders is clearly expressed, and much of this confusion is still reflected in current scholarship of the war. However, though Shirer lived through these events and had a fairly close relationship with a number of sources, ultimately his access to the inner workings of the main players in the war was limited. Hitler was no friend to journalists, particularly those who had close ties to his enemies like Shirer did, specifically France and the US. This confusion may also be a bit of projection on Shirer’s part considering his impressions of Hitler were quite positive when he first came into power, though he later altered this impression (“Writings of History: Authenticity and Self-Censorship in William Shirer’s Berlin Diaries“). This intellectual head-scratching is shared by many, and it underlines the bigger question of whether the red flags that are so clear in hindsight could be missed again by a modern population.