The World Beyond Your Head

Crawford discusses the concept of “embodied perception,” using various examples to illustrate how tools and environments can become extensions of our bodies and minds, particularly through skilled practice. He begins by describing the intimate connection athletes, like hockey players, develop with their equipment, exemplifying this with the story of Alex Ovechkin and his hockey stick, which he uses not just for playing but also for various other functions, demonstrating an integration of tool and user.

Crawford explains that this integration is supported by cognitive extension theory, which posits that tools we become adept at using effectively become part of our body schema—processed by the brain as extensions of our bodies. This theory challenges traditional cognitive psychology, which often views perception as a purely internal process of the brain interpreting sensory data. Instead, Crawford supports a more dynamic view of perception as an active interaction between the body and its environment. He cites the work of James J. Gibson and the emerging field of embodied cognition, which emphasizes that our movements and interactions in a physical space are not just responses to visual stimuli but integral parts of how we perceive and understand the world.

Moreover, Crawford contrasts embodied perception with artificial intelligence and robotics, highlighting the efficiency and adaptability of biological systems that use passive dynamics to interact with their environments, unlike more rigid, controlled robotic systems.

Additionally, Crawford discusses how learning new skills involves adapting our neural resources and recalibrating our actions, using the example of motorcycle riding to illustrate complex embodied cognition. He explains that motorcycle steering dynamics, particularly the counterintuitive practice of counter-steering, require the rider to internalize new reflexes that are initially alien to the natural human body. This process mirrors the way a toddler learns to navigate the world, highlighting the plasticity of our cognitive and motor skills throughout life.

Furthermore, Crawford explores the role of language and conceptual thinking in skilled activities, particularly those involving risk. He introduces a debate between philosophers Hubert Dreyfus, who argues that concepts do not play a role in well-learned skills (referred to as “smooth coping”), and John McDowell, who contends that conceptual thinking remains crucial even in skilled performance. Crawford discusses Bernt Spiegel’s insights on motorcycle riding, highlighting the importance of understanding specific signals in the environment—like seeing one’s shadow in front—that indicate potential dangers not directly perceivable through instinct or habit alone.

Lastly, the chapter touches on the social dimension of acquiring skills. Crawford argues that learning, even in solitary activities like motorcycling, often relies on social interactions where more experienced practitioners share their insights through language, which helps novices direct their attention to relevant aspects of the task at hand.

Crawford discusses the concept of virtual reality as a moral ideal, contrasting the wills of toddlers and adults to illustrate how adult behavior is shaped by material reality and the acquisition of skills. He points out that learning skills transforms our motivations and perception of what is possible in our environment, thus shaping our will in significant ways.

Crawford critiques contemporary children’s television, specifically the transition from the older, slapstick humor of Mickey Mouse cartoons to the problem-solving focus of modern shows like Mickey Mouse Clubhouse. He notes that the older cartoons humorously showcased the frustration arising from the unpredictable behavior of objects, reflecting the reality of human interaction with the material world. In contrast, the new series presents a sanitized reality where problems are easily solved with the help of technology, which always works perfectly and presents no real challenge or frustration.

Moreover, Crawford refers to Silicon Valley’s drive toward a “smarter planet,” where technology anticipates and meets our needs without us having to engage deeply or face any form of resistance from the world. Crawford asserts that “as we ‘build a smarter planet’ (as the IBM advertisements say), the world will become as frictionless as thought itself; ‘smartness’ will subdue dumb nature” (72).

Additionally, Crawford explores Immanuel Kant’s concept of the autonomy of the will, where the will must be self-legislating and independent of external influences or objects to remain pure and free. Crawford contrasts this Kantian ideal with the practical realities of human interaction with the environment—particularly through the development of skills that inherently depend on and respond to external conditions, or what he terms “affordances” and “ecological niches.”

Crawford critiques the contemporary cultural shift toward a virtual reality that idealizes a frictionless existence devoid of the challenges and contingencies that define skilled interaction with the material world. He argues that such portrayals foster a version of self that is insulated from the demands and unpredictability of the real world, aligning with Kant’s vision of autonomy but at the expense of genuine human agency and skill.

Crawford sees this disconnection as contributing to a societal fragility, where individuals are unable to cope with real-world challenges, becoming more susceptible to manipulation through controlled, pleasant, but ultimately superficial experiences. This detachment not only undermines the development of genuine skills but also diminishes the richness of human experience that comes from interacting with and adapting to the external world.